Integrity
Verify what you run
Your browser fetches every file Obleevo is made of, computes its SHA-256 fingerprint itself, and compares it with the list this server published for this version. Nothing is sent anywhere.
Nothing has been fetched yet.
Combined fingerprint
One SHA-256 over every file and its own hash, in a fixed order. Two people who get the same number were served exactly the same code.
What this proves, and what it does not
If everything matches, the code you are running is the code this server published — nothing was altered on the way, by a stale cache or by anything in between.
It does not prove the server itself is honest: a server that serves modified code can serve a modified list with it. What it cannot do is serve one person something different from everyone else without the fingerprints disagreeing. So compare the combined fingerprint with someone else, on another device and another network: the same number means the same code.
The release statement goes one step further. After each release, the fingerprint of its file list is published under /releases/ and timestamped by OpenTimestamps, which anchors it in the Bitcoin blockchain. A match means this server serves the same list it published and timestamped for this version. A fully compromised server could serve a different statement as well — but not without the swap showing to anyone who kept an older copy, because a timestamp cannot be backdated.
Since v1.41.0, each statement is also signed with the owner’s release key (SSH Ed25519), kept offline: the server never holds it, so a hacked server cannot sign the code it serves. This page checks the signature with the key built into the app, and the installed app checks it for every new version before trusting it.
All release statements Threat model Check an .ots proof with the official client
Delivery receipts
Check a receipt
Choose a receipt saved from Obleevo (.obleevo-receipt.json). Both signatures are checked here, in your browser; nothing is sent anywhere. Add the file itself to also check it is the one the receipt is about.
What a receipt proves, and what it does not
Technical proof that these two parties exchanged this exact file: each signed the same receipt with a key made for that room. The time is the receiving device’s own clock, which the sending device accepted as within an hour of its own; no outside service vouches for it. It is not a legal registered-mail service.
Who signed is “the person you verified with the safety words in that room”, not a legal identity. The keys are used once and die with the room, so a receipt ties nobody to anything but that exchange.