Obleevo

Privacy Notice

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What the server sees, and for how long

Version 2.14 · Last updated 1 November 2026

This notice is short because there is little to describe, and specific because a vague privacy notice is worth nothing. Everything below can be checked against the source and against your own browser’s network tab.

The short version. There is no account, no database and no analytics. The signalling server sees a room code, a random connection id, and — unavoidably, because that is how the internet works — your IP address while your socket is open. It never sees your files, messages, drawings, voice, screen, nickname, room password or invite-link secret. The server writes nothing about you to disk; the only thing it keeps is a daily count of how busy it was. Everything about a room ceases to exist when the room does. Your own browser keeps only the application’s own files, cached so it works offline (section 6.4), and three small keys that die with the tab (section 6.2); nothing about what you send or receive is written to it, except a download of 64 MB or more in a browser with no save dialog, kept in the browser’s own storage until you leave the room (section 6.6), and a resume note if you tick “Resume this even if the tab closes” on a transfer (section 6.5). The Vault encrypts files, notes and passwords on your device into a file you keep; none of it reaches the server or your browser’s storage (section 6.7).

This is not anonymity. We cannot read what you share, but Obleevo is not an anonymity tool: section 20 lists what can and cannot be traced.

A summary is not the notice. The detail below is what governs.

1. Who is responsible

The controller for the processing described here is The House of Brendrof, based in Quebec, Canada, contactable at privacy@obleevo.com. No data protection officer has been appointed. No representative has been appointed in the European Union or the United Kingdom.

Under Quebec’s Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector, the person in charge of the protection of personal information is the owner of The House of Brendrof, reachable at the same address. Where that person is not designated in writing, the role falls by law to the person with the highest authority in the enterprise.

This notice covers the signalling service at https://obleevo.com. It does not cover what other participants do with what you send them, which is between you and them.

2. Why there is so little to describe

The server’s only job is to introduce two browsers and then step aside. It passes opaque connection blobs between sockets in the same room; once the browsers have a direct encrypted channel, everything travels between them and never through it. There is no database, no object storage and no message queue: all state lives in the memory of one process and is lost when that process restarts.

This is the reason the lists below are short. It is a property of the design rather than a promise about our intentions, and you do not have to take our word for either — the code your browser runs is the code of each published release, which anyone can check at /verify.html, and the network traffic is inspectable in your own browser’s developer tools.

3. What the server processes

Data Why How long
IP address Inherent to any TCP connection. Your IP address is seen by the web server in front of the app for the connection only; the app itself no longer receives it. Not logged, not stored, not used to identify or count you. In memory only, for the life of the connection
Room code To put the right browsers in the same room. Life of the room, which ends the moment the last person leaves. A room nobody has entered yet is kept two minutes
Connection id A random string identifying a socket within a room, so signalling can be routed. It is not derived from anything about you and changes every session. Life of the socket
Signalling blobs Session descriptions and network candidates, passed between two sockets unread. They contain the network addresses the browsers will use. Not retained — relayed and discarded
Room settings Which entry mode, whether strict, whether it burns, when it expires, how many people it holds, and which of files, screen sharing, voice, the board and the notes it allows. Needed to enforce them — or, for those five, to give every member the same rules, which each browser then enforces. Whether it is a room for your own devices (Connect my devices) is kept too, because the server then fixes its rules itself: only someone holding the link gets in, four seats at most, and it closes when the device that opened it leaves. The door is kept here too: whether the host has locked the room or lets people in by hand, and — if the host limited the invite link — until when, or for how many more people, it lets them straight in. Life of the room
Password salt and verifier For password rooms. The password itself never reaches the server; only a PBKDF2-SHA256 derivation of it, computed in your browser, is compared. Life of the room
Proof-of-work challenge A puzzle issued per join attempt, so joining can be rate-limited without knowing who is joining. It is signed rather than remembered: the server keeps only puzzles already solved, so that none can be spent twice. Not kept when issued; once solved, until its two minutes are up
Rejoin token A random string letting you reclaim your seat after a network blip without knocking or retyping a password. Using it hands you a new one, and it stops working once the new one is used. One room only. Until its replacement is used, or until your seat is given up: you leave, the room closes, or your connection stays down past the short grace period
Knock ticket For approval rooms: a random id for a pending request. The label shown to the host is encrypted with the room secret, which the server does not have. Ninety seconds
Daily activity counters How busy the server was, per UTC day: connections open at the busiest minute, connection-minutes, rooms opened, seats taken, the worst delay of its event loop, and how many minutes it ran. Numbers only — no address, no room code, no identifier, and no time finer than the day. A day is published only once it is over, so its numbers cannot say when anything in it happened. Shown on the status page as a calendar, and their running total on the front page. Where the operator sets it up, they are kept in a Cloudflare KV store so a restart does not reset them. Up to 371 days

Nothing in this table is written to disk except the daily counters in its last row, which say how busy the machine was and never who made it busy. There is no analytics, no telemetry, no error-reporting service, no advertising and no fingerprinting. The web server in front of the application keeps no access log, and the application’s own log holds only operational messages — never an IP address. The server’s firewall does record the connection attempts it blocks, on ports the service does not use, with their source address; the system deletes those records after at most five weeks.

4. What the server never receives

5. The invite link

An invite link looks like https://example/#12345-SECRET. Everything after the # is a URL fragment, and fragments are resolved entirely inside the browser: they do not appear in the request line, and the Referrer-Policy is set so they do not appear in a Referer header either. The secret carried there is what lets two participants verify each other automatically, and it is something the server has never seen.

The application removes the fragment from the address bar as soon as you are in the room, so it is not sitting in view during a screen share, and keeps the secret in memory instead. Anywhere you paste that link, of course, the secret goes too.

6. What is stored in your browser

6.1 Cookies: none. The application sets no cookies, and the signalling library is configured not to. There is no consent banner because there is nothing to consent to.

6.2 Session storage. Three keys, none holding anything you wrote or sent: gd-agreed, the version of the Terms you accepted; gd-lang, the interface language, if you picked one; and gd-guided, a mark that the three-step guide was already shown in this tab. They die with the tab. They are never sent to the server.

6.3 Local storage: none. Deliberately. Your theme choice is kept in memory only, because a remembered preference is itself a record that this browser opened Obleevo.

6.4 Service worker cache. The application’s own static files — HTML, stylesheet, scripts, fonts — are cached so it works offline. No user content is ever cached. Burning a room clears this cache and unregisters the worker.

6.5 Resuming a transfer, if you ask for it. A large download survives a network blip. If the tab closes or the browser stops, what had already arrived stays in the file you chose (Chrome and Edge on a computer, files of 64 MB or more): in a new room you can pick that partial file, it is checked block by block on your device, and only what is missing is sent — nothing about it is kept in the browser. Otherwise the record of which blocks arrived lives in memory. If you tick Resume this even if the tab closes when you accept a file, that record is written to an IndexedDB database named ghostdrop-resume in your browser. It holds the file’s name and size, which blocks were verified, the hashes needed to verify the rest, and the handle your browser gave the application when you chose where to save. It does not hold the file’s contents — those are already in the file you picked. It is never sent to the server or to any other participant. It is deleted when the transfer finishes, when you cancel it, when you leave or burn the room, and in any case after seven days. Leaving the room deletes the whole database rather than emptying it, so the name stops appearing in your browser’s own storage listing. Apart from the application’s own files (6.4), the tab’s three keys (6.2) and a download arriving in a browser with no save dialog (6.6), this is the only thing Obleevo writes to your browser’s storage, and it is off unless you ask for it, per transfer.

6.6 Files you save. A received file is written where you told the browser to put it. It is yours from that moment and nothing in the application can reach it again. A browser with no save dialog — on a phone, in Safari, in Firefox — cannot be told where to put it. There, a download of 64 MB or more is written, as it arrives, into the browser’s own private storage for this site, which is not your files and which no other site can read, and is handed to the browser’s Downloads once every block has been verified; a folder is handed over as one .zip file. A smaller one stays in the tab’s memory until then. That storage is never sent to the server or to anyone else. While it arrives it is encrypted there with a key that exists only in the tab’s memory, and decrypted where it lies only once every block is in, so a download cut short by a closed or crashed tab leaves nothing readable behind. It is erased when you leave or burn the room, and anything a closed or crashed tab left there is erased the next time Obleevo opens. Two kinds of received file are never saved at all: a picture or video sent as View once, and a picture passed through the Clipboard tab. Both stay in the tab’s memory only (section 12).

6.7 The Vault. The Obleevo Vault, on the home page and at /vault, encrypts files, notes, passwords and 2FA codes on your device into a single .obleevo file that you save wherever you choose. All of it happens in your browser: your passphrase is turned into a key by Argon2id in a background worker on your device, and everything is encrypted with AES-256-GCM in the page. Nothing — not the file, not what is in it, not the names of what is in it, not the passphrase — is sent to the server or to anyone else, and nothing of it is written to your browser’s storage: an open vault exists only in the tab’s memory, and it locks after 10 minutes without activity or 5 minutes in the background. Leaving the page while a vault is open asks you first; panic and burning a room still lock it at once. If only the server says the room burned while its host is still connected, the room carries on between you without the server and nobody new can join; if the host then stays silent for about 2 minutes (3 in a background tab), the room ends and the vault locks. In Chrome and Edge on a computer, saving writes over the file the vault was opened from, once your browser has asked your permission; that permission covers that one file and is held in the tab’s memory only. Elsewhere each save is a new download, and the app reminds you to delete the old one. Changing the passphrase gives the vault new keys: once you save, the new file cannot be opened with the old passphrase, nor with anything an old copy gave away. Copies made before still open with the old passphrase, and a cloud drive may keep earlier versions of its own. A file received in a room that you put into your vault goes from the tab’s memory into the vault, on your device. The offline opener is a single HTML file you download, which opens a vault with no internet connection and no contact with Obleevo at all. We hold nothing from which a vault could be recovered, so a forgotten passphrase cannot be reset by anyone.

2FA codes, imports and sharing. A 2FA secret lives only inside the encrypted file, and its codes are computed on your device. You add one by pasting an otpauth link, typing the secret, or scanning the site’s QR code with your camera (section 12). A password list exported from Bitwarden, 1Password, Chrome or Edge as a CSV file is read entirely on your device, and nothing of it is uploaded; that file holds your passwords in plain text, so the app reminds you to delete it. A note, password or 2FA code you share from the vault in a room is sent sealed, as View once, to one person or to the room — in a Strict room, only to people who are verified — and nothing of it is kept on either side once it is closed. Sharing a 2FA code sends only the current code, never the secret. A photo of the screen taken with another device cannot be prevented.

7. What is handed to your operating system

Notifications are off until you switch them on, and permission is asked for only when you do. What they say comes from a fixed list of six sentences chosen by which event occurred — a file is waiting, someone wants in, and so on. They never contain a file name, a nickname, a message, a room code or any other content, because the application selects a list entry rather than composing text. This matters: a notification is written to a notification centre by software this application does not control, so anything a notification said would have left the room. They are raised only while the tab is in the background, and you can switch them off again at any time.

The screen is kept awake while a transfer, call or screen share is running, and released as soon as nothing is happening. This sends no data anywhere; it asks your browser not to let the device sleep.

The share button hands the invite link to your operating system’s share sheet, and then to whichever application you pick from it. That link contains the secret that admits someone to the room, so treat sharing it exactly as you would treat sending it any other way: whoever receives it can join, and the application you share through will have a copy. Nothing else is passed to the share sheet — no files, no messages, no contacts are read.

Dictation is off unless you allow it. Turning speech into text is done by your browser’s own speech service, not by Obleevo. Where the browser can do it on the device, it does, and nothing leaves. Where it cannot, the sound of your voice is sent to the browser’s maker — Google for Chrome, Microsoft for Edge, Apple for Safari — under their terms, and the application tells you so and asks before the first time. Voice messages are different: they are recorded in your browser and sent to the room over the same encrypted peer-to-peer channel as a chat message, and never pass through the server or anyone else.

Translation is off until you switch it on, and it happens on your device. Where the browser has a built-in translator, the Translate button lets it put other people’s messages into your language. The words never leave your device and never reach Obleevo or anyone else. The first time a language is needed, the browser may download a language model from its maker — Google for Chrome — under their terms, and only in answer to your click. That download carries no message text, but it can tell the maker which languages were asked for. Where the browser has no built-in translator, the button is not shown.

The browser tab’s title shows a count of messages you have not seen and, during a transfer, a percentage. It never shows a name or any content, and it is cleared when you return to the tab.

8. Legal bases and consent

Where the UK or EU General Data Protection Regulation applies, we rely on:

Quebec. Under the Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector, we collect only the information necessary to provide the service you asked for, and we collect it from you directly. The purposes are those set out in section 3 and no others. No identification, localisation or profiling technology is used; had one been, section 8.1 of the Act would require us to tell you and to give you the means to switch it off, and there is nothing here to switch off. Privacy settings are at their highest by default because there are no settings to lower.

9. Retention

Retention periods are in the table in section 3. The general rule is that a room’s state is destroyed when the room is destroyed — when the host burns it, when it reaches its time limit, the moment the last participant leaves, or when the process restarts. There is no backup, because there is nothing to back up. One exception: when the host burns a room opened from a meeting link, the server keeps a scrambled fingerprint of that room’s code, and nothing else, in memory for 12 hours, so the same link cannot open it again; the code itself cannot be read back from it, and a restart, or many rooms burned, forgets it sooner.

Burning a room, or the host leaving a room set to burn, also tells every participant’s browser to clear the origin’s caches, storage and service worker. In a room set to burn, someone offline at that moment is put out and their browser cleared once they are back, within about a minute; if the host simply vanishes, the others are within about 2 minutes, or 3 in a tab left in the background. In a room not set to burn, Burn clears the browsers connected to the host at that moment; someone offline or not connected to the host is put out without the clearing. A browser that never connected to the host’s is only disconnected, without the clearing. Whoever runs the server and the relay, or a broken network path, can end a room set to burn for someone whose link to the host it cuts: their browser is then cleared within about 1 to 2 minutes (3 in a tab left in the background), and files they already saved are untouched. If the host left and the server named a new host, that host’s Burn puts the others out without clearing their browsers; in a room not set to burn, a new host named by the server is taken after about 1.5 minutes of the host’s silence. While another Obleevo tab in that browser is receiving a download, the browser is not asked to clear the origin’s storage as a whole, so that download survives; the page still erases its own. Files already saved to their disk are theirs and are untouched.

On your own device. A resume note you opted into (section 6.5) is kept until the transfer finishes, until you cancel it, until you leave or burn the room, or for seven days, whichever comes first. A download held in your browser’s own storage (section 6.6) is kept until you leave or burn the room, or, if the tab closed or crashed first, until the next time Obleevo opens. Nothing else about what you send or receive is kept anywhere.

10. Recipients and processors

10.1 Hosting. OVHcloud (Beauharnois, Quebec, Canada) operates the machine the signalling process runs on and can therefore observe connection metadata at the network level. They act as a processor under the data processing agreement that is part of OVHcloud’s contract.

10.2 STUN. Browsers contact a STUN server to learn their own public address. Our own server (turn.obleevo.com) and Cloudflare’s (stun.cloudflare.com), both of which your browser asks for a direct path every time a connection is set up, therefore see your IP address. If that matters to you, run your own — it is a one-line configuration change.

10.3 TURN relay. The relay used first is run by Cloudflare, Inc.; the backup is described below. Every browser in a room contacts Cloudflare’s relay while the connection is set up, whether or not Hide my IP is on: it can see your IP address, the addresses you are paired with, and the timing and volume of the traffic; your media stays encrypted end to end. When Hide my IP is on, your encrypted media also passes through it. Relay credentials identify this service to the relay, not you. Only somebody seated in a room, or running the network test, receives any. Each seat gets its own, under a random name rather than anything about you, renewed while you are in the room. Those for Cloudflare’s relay are valid for at most an hour (less as its monthly allowance runs low) and cancelled the moment you leave the room or it ends; those for the backup relay described below cannot be cancelled, so they are valid for at most ten minutes. The relay’s long-term secret or API token never leaves the server. The relay has a monthly allowance: the server reads, from Cloudflare, only the total number of bytes the relay carried per day - nothing about who - and when the allowance is used up, or cannot be read, it stops handing out credentials for it and cancels the ones already out. Where a backup relay is set up - run by The House of Brendrof on a server rented from OVHcloud in Beauharnois, Quebec - it takes over at that moment; it sees the same things, your IP address and your peers’ but never the content, and its software is set to keep no logs. Without a backup, or with it unavailable too, connections are direct until the allowance frees up; Hide my IP then says it is paused rather than connecting you without it.

10.4 Nobody else. No analytics provider, no advertising network, no CDN, no font service, no error tracker. The application’s Content-Security-Policy forbids loading anything from a foreign origin, which is a technical guarantee of this rather than an assurance. Two things leave only when you ask: pressing Look up on VirusTotal opens VirusTotal, a Google service, in a new tab with the file’s SHA-256 digest in its address — so VirusTotal receives that digest and your IP address under its own terms, never the file; and email you send us is routed by Cloudflare to the Google (Gmail) mailbox where we read it. The list of known malware the file check uses is downloaded from this site and compared inside your browser; nothing about your file is sent to do it.

10.5 Law enforcement. We will respond to a valid legal order. What could be produced is limited to what exists at that moment: whether a given room code is live, the sockets attached to it and their network addresses while they are open, the daily counters, and the system logs described in section 20. An order can also require us to preserve what exists from then on, or to collect what the server sees from that moment. We cannot produce content, or a history of closed rooms, because none of it exists. Other providers answer for what they hold (section 20).

11. International transfers

The signalling service is hosted in Canada (Quebec). Where connection data leaves the UK or EEA, the transfer relies on the European Commission’s adequacy decision for Canada and the United Kingdom’s equivalent adequacy regulations. Your content does not transit our infrastructure at all; it goes wherever the two browsers are, which is a matter between the participants.

The signalling server and the backup relay are both in Quebec, so running them communicates nothing outside Quebec. Cloudflare’s STUN server and relay (sections 10.2 and 10.3) are run by a company based in the United States, on servers around the world: your browser uses them every time a connection is set up, so your IP address is handled outside Quebec, for as long as the connection lasts and never with any content it can read. Email you send us passes through Cloudflare on its way to the Google mailbox where we read it (section 10.4).

Your microphone is opened only when you press the call button, or the microphone button beside the message box to record a voice message or dictate, and never in response to anything another participant sends. A recording releases it as soon as it stops or is thrown away. Leaving the call stops the microphone tracks, which is what turns your browser’s recording indicator off. Muting stops the audio being sent but keeps the call open; leaving is what releases the device.

Disguise my voice is off unless you pick Deep, High, Chipmunk, Monster, Radio, Whisper or Ghost; while it is off, your microphone is sent as it is. The change is made on your device, by your browser’s own audio processing, before anything is sent: what leaves is the call audio already described, disguised, over the same encrypted connection — no recording, no sample of your voice, nothing to us or to anyone else. A voice message recorded while it is on is disguised too; dictation is not, because your browser’s speech service listens to the microphone itself (section 7). The others on the call see a “disguised voice” marker by your name. If the disguise cannot be set up when you join the call, you are not put on it with your real voice instead. It is not anonymity: a pitch shift can be undone with an audio editor, and even Whisper, which removes the pitch entirely, leaves your words, accent and way of speaking recognisable.

Audio from other participants is not played until you join the call. Anyone connected to you can start sending audio at any time — that is a property of the peer-to-peer connection, not a choice this application makes — so unsolicited audio is held rather than played, and the call view tells you how many people are talking. It begins playing when you join, and stops when you leave.

Files are never written without your acceptance. A file you have not accepted has no save location, no partial file and no record; data sent for it is discarded unread. A voice message is not a file: it arrives without being accepted, is kept in the tab’s memory only, and plays only when you press it.

Your camera is used for three things, each only after you press a scan button: reading a room’s QR code on the join screen, reading another participant’s code with Scan their code in the safety-words dialog, and reading a website’s 2FA QR code when you add a 2FA code to your vault. It is opened without the microphone, the picture is read by your browser on your device to find the code, and nothing it sees is recorded or sent anywhere. It is released the moment a code is found, the scanner is closed, or you leave the page.

Your clipboard is read only when you press Paste here in the Clipboard tab of a room for your own devices, once for each press, and your browser may ask you first. What it holds is then sent, sealed, to your other devices in that room — over the connection between them, never through our server — and nowhere else. The application writes to your clipboard when you press a Copy button, and on its own in one case only: a text clip arriving from one of your own devices in that room while this page is the one in front. A picture always waits for you to press Accept, then Copy. Clips are held in the tab’s memory only, never stored, and go with the room. Once something is on your clipboard it belongs to your operating system: other applications can read it, and a clipboard history or a sync between devices, if you have one turned on, may keep it.

A picture or a video you received can be shown in the page. It is read back from your own copy — the file you saved, or the one held in memory — never fetched from the network, and never from a file your browser’s check flagged as dangerous. Nothing about it is kept once you leave the room.

Something sent as View once — a message, or a single picture or short video — is held in the tab’s memory only. A file still has to be accepted (Accept) and pass your browser’s check first, and it is never saved to disk, never offered in a save dialog and never noted for resuming. It is dropped when you close it, and your application tells the sender it was opened. A photo of the screen taken with another device cannot be prevented, and a modified application could keep it.

13. What other participants can see

13.1 A direct peer-to-peer connection reveals your IP address to the other participants. That is how WebRTC works. Hide my IP, where a relay is configured, replaces your address with the relay’s — moving who sees it rather than removing it.

13.2 Participants see your chosen nickname, anything you send, and — if you share a screen — whatever is on it, including notifications that arrive while you are sharing. They also see when you are typing, whether your hand is raised in a call, and — unless you switch read receipts off with the eye beside the message box — when you have read a message they sent; that is told to its author alone. While someone shares a screen with you, they also receive the size of your screen, so what they send fits it. When five or more people watch a screen, the computer of one of them may pass it on to up to four others, over the connection it already has with each; it sees nothing it was not already watching, it is named on the tile, and every copy is sealed again for the one person receiving it. Nothing about it goes through our server. When you offer a file, everyone you offer it to receives, before they accept: its name, its exact size, its SHA-256 fingerprint, its first four kilobytes and, where there is one, a preview — the first 1,200 characters of a text file, a 256-pixel thumbnail of a picture with its original dimensions, or one frame of a video with its dimensions and length. They also receive the sender’s scan report, whose notes can quote short parts of the file, such as the names of programs inside an archive; a file of 4 KB or smaller is seen whole.

13.3 Anything a participant receives, they can keep. Our erasure guarantees are about our systems and about the browser’s own memory. They are not, and cannot be, a guarantee about other people.

14. Security

No system is perfectly secure, and this one is no exception. What we can say is specific: the operator is not in a position to read your content, and that is structural rather than a matter of trust.

15. Personal data breaches and confidentiality incidents

In the event of a breach likely to result in a risk to your rights and freedoms, we will notify the Commission d’accès à l’information du Québec within 72 hours of becoming aware of it, and will notify affected individuals where the risk is high. Because we hold no contact details for anybody, individual notification would necessarily take the form of a prominent public notice on the service.

In Quebec, a confidentiality incident presenting a risk of serious injury is reported promptly to the Commission d’accès à l’information and to the persons concerned, and is entered in the register of confidentiality incidents the Act requires us to keep. That register is available to the Commission on request.

16. Your rights

Where the UK or EU GDPR applies you have the rights of access, rectification, erasure, restriction, portability, and objection to processing based on legitimate interests. Write to privacy@obleevo.com.

In Quebec you have the rights of access and rectification under sections 27 and 28 of the Act, the right to withdraw consent, the right to cease dissemination and to de-index, and — since 22 September 2024 — the right to portability: to receive the computerised personal information you provided, in a structured and commonly used technological format. We answer within 30 days.

We have to be honest about what those rights get you here. We hold no identifiers that would let us find data relating to you — no account, no cookie, no stored IP address. Under Article 11 GDPR, a controller who cannot identify a data subject is not obliged to acquire additional information in order to do so, and the Quebec Act is to the same practical effect. A request for access will be answered truthfully and unhelpfully: there is nothing held about you to produce, and a portability request has nothing to export. Erasure happens on its own, continuously, as rooms close.

You may complain to a supervisory authority. In Quebec that is the Commission d’accès à l’information du Québec; in the UK, the Information Commissioner’s Office; in the EU, the authority in your country of residence. Our lead authority is the Commission d’accès à l’information du Québec.

17. California and other US states

17.1 In the twelve months preceding this notice the categories of personal information handled are limited to identifiers, in the form of an IP address held transiently for the life of a network connection, and internet activity in the form of the connection metadata described in section 3. Both are collected directly from your device and used solely to provide the service you requested.

17.2 We do not sell personal information and do not share it for cross-context behavioural advertising, as those terms are defined by the California Consumer Privacy Act as amended. We have never done so. There is no financial-incentive programme, and we do not discriminate against anyone for exercising a privacy right.

17.3 We collect no sensitive personal information and therefore have nothing to limit the use of.

17.4 Rights to know, delete, correct and opt out may be exercised at privacy@obleevo.com, subject to the same practical limitation described in section 16: we hold no identifier that would let us connect a request to any data. Residents of other states with comparable statutes — Colorado, Connecticut, Virginia, Utah, Texas, Oregon, Montana and others — may exercise the equivalent rights the same way.

18. Children

The service is not directed to children and we do not knowingly process their personal data. Since we collect no age information and hold no accounts, we cannot detect a child’s use. If you believe a child has used the service in a way that concerns you, contact us — though it is worth knowing in advance that there will be no stored data for us to delete.

19. Automated decision-making

There is none within the meaning of Article 22 GDPR or section 12.1 of the Quebec Act. The rate limiter and the proof-of-work gate are mechanical thresholds applied to a connection, not decisions about a person, and they produce no legal or similarly significant effect. No decision about anyone is made exclusively by automated processing, so there is nothing for us to inform you of and nothing for you to submit observations on.

20. What can be traced, and what cannot

Obleevo is not an anonymity tool and is not made for escaping the law; illegal uses are forbidden (section 6 of the Terms). This section gives the facts in both directions, so that everyone, authorities included, knows exactly what exists. It describes the public service at obleevo.com.

What does not exist on our side.

What remains traceable.

We answer valid orders with what exists (section 10.5). Do not count on the service to hide you or to erase what you have done.

21. Changes to this notice

We may update this notice. The version and date at the top will change, and material changes will be announced on the service itself. We cannot email you about it, for the reason this whole document describes.

22. Contact

The House of Brendrof
Quebec, Canada — reachable by email only
Privacy: privacy@obleevo.com
Person in charge of the protection of personal information (Quebec): the owner of The House of Brendrof
Data protection officer: No data protection officer has been appointed

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Obleevo is developed by The House of Brendrof. Proprietary software, free to use.

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